To be Argued By: DANIEL S. RATNER (Time Requested: 15 Minutes)

Court of Appeals

of the

State of New York

RACQUEL LIVIDINI,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

– against –

HAROLD L. GOLDSTEIN, D.P.M. and VINAI PRAKASH, D.P.M.,

Defendants-Respondents,

- and -

RYE AMBULATORY SURGERY CENTER, L.L.C. and WESTMED MEDICAL GROUP, P.C.,

Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

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Bronx County Clerk's Index No.: 20675/2018E

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RULE 500.1(F) DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The corporate entity RYE AMBULATORY SURGERY CENTER, L.L.C. has no parents, subsidiaries or affiliates. WESTMED MEDICAL GROUP, P.C. has two subsidiaries known as Westmed Foundation and Westmed Ventures, respectively.

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STATEMENT

In this medical malpractice action, Defendants-Appellants Rye Ambulatory Surgery Center, L.L.C. and Westmed Medical Group, P.C. (collectively "Westmed") offer this brief in support of their appeal from an Order of the Appellate Division, First Department dated November 26, 2019, reversing an Order of the Supreme Court, Bronx County entered July 26, 2018, granting a motion to change the venue of this action from Bronx County to Westchester County (R. 162-176).¹ In an Order dated November 26, 2019, the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to this Court on the following certified question: "Was the order of this Court, which reversed the order of Supreme Court, properly made?" (R. 177).

Bronx County has no nexus to this lawsuit save one individual defendant's minor affiliation with an unrelated employer in Bronx County. This appeal presents an opportunity for the Court to clarify that venue may not be placed in a county where no party resides or has a principal place of business.

QUESTION PRESENTED

In a medical malpractice action, most of the parties reside in Westchester County, none reside in Bronx County, the medical treatment at issue occurred in Westchester County, and the individual defendants were sued based on their actions as employees of corporations having their principal place of business in Westchester County. Was venue properly placed in

¹ Numerals in parentheses preceded by "R." refer to the pages of the Record on Appeal.

Bronx County merely because one individual defendant listed a Bronx County address with a licensing agency?

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal under CPLR 5602(b)(1) and 5614. The Appellate Division, First Department granted leave to appeal to this Court on the following certified question: "Was the order of this Court, which reversed the order of Supreme Court, properly made?" (R. 177).

The issues raised on appeal are preserved for review. Westmed moved for a change of venue under CPLR §§ 503 and 510(1) by notice of motion dated April 17, 2018 (R. 43-44), arguing that Plaintiff's designation of Bronx County as the venue was improper under those statutes because none of the parties reside in that county or has a principal place of business in that county (R. 46-48).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. <u>Background</u>

Westchester Medical Group, P.C., doing business as Westmed Medical Group, P.C. and Rye Ambulatory Surgery Center, LLC (collectively "Westmed"), is a multispecialty medical practice, staffed by 500 physicians and advanced care providers and 1,500 clinical employees, with thirteen office locations in Westchester County, New York, and Fairfield County, Connecticut.² Rye Ambulatory Surgery

² See <u>https://www.westmedgroup.com/about-us/</u> (visited Feb. 19, 2020).

Center is an outpatient healthcare facility located in Rye, New York.³ Both entities have their principal places of business in Westchester County. Both entities list Westchester addresses with the Department of State, Division of Corporations for service of process (R. 81-87).

Plaintiff Racquel Lividini, a resident of Westchester County (R. 17) commenced this podiatric malpractice action in Bronx County based on "defendants' principal place of business" (R. 17). Although all but one of the parties reside in Westchester County, none of the parties have a principal place of business in Bronx County, and all medical treatment was rendered in Westchester County, Plaintiff chose Bronx County because Defendant Dr. Harold L. Goldstein listed a Bronx address when he registered his license with the New York State Education Department (R. 139).⁴

B. <u>The Motions to Change Venue</u>

Plaintiff rejected Dr. Goldstein's Demand for a Change of Venue under CPLR 511(b) (R. 32) by submitting an attorney affidavit claiming that Dr. Goldstein has a principal place of business in Bronx County at 2016 Bronxdale Avenue, which is where Dr. Goldstein was served with the summons and complaint (R. 35-36).

³ See <u>http://ryeasc.com/about_us.aspx</u> (visited Feb. 19, 2020).

⁴ Co-defendant Vinai Prakash, D.P.M. was a resident of the State of Washington (R. 97-98, 107).

Dr. Goldstein then moved for a change of venue to Westchester County (R. 9). In a supporting affidavit, Dr. Goldstein explained that he (1) lives in Westchester County; (2) provided all podiatric care to Ms. Lividini in Westchester County; (3) is employed by Westmed Medical Group, P.C., a corporation with its principal place of business in Westchester County; (4) renders podiatric care to his Westmed patients in offices located in Westchester County; (5) performs podiatric surgery at Rye Ambulatory Center, L.L.C., a corporation with its principal place of business in Westchester County; and (6) over seventy-five percent of his income is derived from podiatric care provided in Westchester County (R. 38-40).

Dr. Goldstein added that a small percentage of his practice is devoted to working in Bronx County based on his affiliation with non-party St. Barnabas Hospital (R. 39). Two afternoons per week he supervises podiatric residents at two St. Barnabas Hospital clinics where 150 patients per month are seen (R. 39). Additionally, he sees 20-25 patients per month at a Bronx Park Medical pavilion located [at] 2016 Bronxdale Avenue, Bronx, New York (R. 39).

Westmed also moved for a change of venue to Westchester County (R. 43). Westmed's medical director, Steven M. Meixner, M.D. submitted an affirmation in which he attested that Westchester Medical Group, P.C.'s ("d/b/a Westmed Medical Group, P.C and The Rye Ambulatory Surgery Center, LLC") principal place of business and principal office is located at 2700 Westchester

Avenue, 2nd Floor Purchase, New York, 10577, and that Westmed does not maintain offices in Bronx County. Dr. Meixner added that Dr. Goldstein is an employee of Westchester Medical Group, P.C., practicing at locations in Rye and White Plains in Westchester County, and that Plaintiff was treated at those locations (R. 79-81).

Finally, Dr. Prakash moved for a change of venue, joining in the motions by Dr. Goldstein and Westmed (R. 94-98).

In opposition to the motions, Plaintiff argued that Bronx County was a proper venue because Defendants failed to establish that Dr. Goldstein was not a resident of Bronx County for venue purposes (R. 120-38). Plaintiff asserted that her choice of venue was proper because Dr. Goldstein's principal place of business is in Bronx County (R. 121). Plaintiff based this claim on Dr. Goldstein's listing of "Bronx, NY" as his address on his official license registration with the New York State Education Department ("NYSED") (R. 139) and the fact that Dr. Goldstein occasionally sees patients at St. Barnabas Hospital (R. 124).

Supreme Court, Bronx County granted the motions, holding that Dr. Goldstein's principal place of business for venue purposes is in Westchester County. The court relied on an affidavit by Dr. Goldstein, holding that the affidavit "sufficiently describes why his principal place of business is at WestMed Medical Group in Westchester County" (R. 8).

C. <u>The Appeal to the Appellate Division</u>

In a 3-2 majority decision dated August 20, 2019, the Appellate Division, First Department reversed the lower court's order, returning the action to Bronx County (R. 162-76; *see also Lividini v. Goldstein*, 175 A.D.3d 420, 422 (1st Dep't 2019)).

The majority ruled that Dr. Goldstein failed to show that Plaintiff's designation of Bronx County was improper because Dr. Goldstein's affidavit was "devoid of supporting documentation of residency" (R. 165; *Lividini*, 175 A.D.3d at 422).

The majority further held that Plaintiff sufficiently rebutted defendants' proof by submitting Dr. Goldstein's New York State Education Department (NYSED) physician license registration, which listed only a Bronx address (R. 167; *Lividini*, 175 A.D.3d at 422-23). According to the majority, Dr. Goldstein did not dispute this evidence, did not submit documentary evidence, and indeed admitted in how own affidavit that he "maintains a regular practice in the Bronx." (R. 163; *Lividini*, 175 A.D.3d at 420.)

After observing that under CPLR §503(a) a party may reside in more than one county, and that under CPLR §503(d) venue can be placed in the county where an individually-owned business has its principal office, the majority held that Plaintiff offered sufficient evidence - namely the NYSED listing and Dr. Goldstein's affiliation with St. Barnabas Hospital - that Dr. Goldstein was a "resident" of Bronx County for venue purposes (R.165-69; *Lividini*, 175 A.D.3d at 422-23).

Two justices (Singh and Friedman, J.) dissented.

First, the dissent observed that venue based on individual residence under CPLR §503(a) does not apply in a situation where it is undisputed that none of the parties reside in Bronx County (R. 171; *Lividini*, 175 A.D.3d at 424 [Singh and Friedman dissenting]).

Second, addressing the applicability of CPLR §503(d), the dissent relied on *Young Sun Chung v. Kwah*, 122 A.D.3d 729 (2d Dep't 2014), in which the Second Department held that the county of an individually named physician's principal office is a proper venue under CPLR §503(d) for claims arising out of that business. The dissent observed that "[m]erely listing a mailing address with a regulatory agency in order to obtain a license to practice medicine in New York is not proof of a licensee's principal place of business." (R. 173; *Lividini*, 175 A.D.3d at 425 [Singh and Friedman dissenting]). The dissent further observed that on its face the NYSED listing does not state that Bronx County is Dr. Goldstein's principal place of business (R. 174; *Lividini*, 175 A.D.3d at 425 [Singh and Friedman dissenting]).

ARGUMENT

BRONX COUNTY IS NOT A PROPER VENUE

A. <u>The Moving Parties Made an Adequate Showing in Support of the Motion</u>.

As the Appellate Division majority correctly observed, the party seeking a change in venue has the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff's choice of venue was improper. *Lividini*, 175 A.D.3d at 421 (citing CPLR 510(1); 511(b)). But the majority also appears to have a created a new and unduly stringent burden of proof in holding that Dr. Goldstein's affidavit was insufficient to prove that Plaintiff's designation of Bronx County was improper in the absence of "supporting documentation." *Id.* at 422.

Consistent with the weight of the authorities cited below, this Court should hold that Dr. Goldstein's affidavit, in which he explained his employment relationship with Westmed and stated that he treats the vast majority of his patients in Westchester County, was detailed enough to establish that he was a resident of Westchester County and that his principal place of business was in Westchester County. *See DiCicco v. Cattani*, 5 A.D.3d 318 (1st Dep't 2014) (holding that motion to change venue was properly granted on the basis of defendant's affidavit, which sufficiently demonstrated that his principal office was located in Staten Island, where the alleged malpractice occurred); *Pasley v. St. Agnes Hosp.*, 244 A.D.2d 469 (2d Dep't 1997) (holding that defendants' affidavits were sufficient to demonstrate that their principal medical offices were located in Westchester County); *Kielczewski v. Pinnacle Restoration Corp.*, 226 A.D.2d 211 (1st Dep't 1996) (holding that although defendant general partnership's business certificate listed as its office "c/o" a Bronx County address, trial court properly considered the affidavits of the general partners that the partnership's principal office has always been in New Jersey or Westchester County, in finding that none of the parties reside in Bronx County).

Arguably, the result should be different if a moving party's affidavit is facially insufficient. Indeed, in each of the cases cited by the majority below (*see Lividini*, 175 A.D.3d at 422) the movant relied on what were described as "conclusory" affidavits, containing bare statements pertaining to residency or principal place of business. These affidavits were deemed inadequate, particularly in light of contradictory documentary evidence supporting not only the plaintiff's original choice of venue, but also suggesting that the moving party's bare denials were disingenuous in nature. *See Fix v. B & B Mall Assoc., Inc.*, 118 A.D.3d 477 (1st Dep't 2014) (holding that affidavit by corporate defendant's president averring that its principal place of business was in Westchester County and denying that it maintains a place of business or office in Bronx County was insufficient on its face

and in contrast to plaintiff's submission of documentary evidence that defendant had an office address in Bronx County and defendant's own reliance on a receipt from the New York State Department of State, which also indicated that it had designated Bronx County as its principal place of business); Singh v. Empire Intl., Ltd., 95 A.D.3d 793 (1st Dep't 2012) (holding that defendant's "conclusory" affidavit attesting to a Queens County residency was insufficient in contrast to plaintiff's submission of a police accident report showing that all parties, including defendant, had addresses outside of New York State at the time of the accident, permitting plaintiff to designate any county as the venue for trial); Broderick v. R.Y. Mgmt. Co., 13 A.D.3d 197 (1st Dep't 2004) (affidavits by general partner in defendant partnership stating that defendant's principal and only office was in New York County was deemed insufficient and "disingenuous" in light of documentary evidence offered by plaintiff in opposition to motion showing that defendant maintained two offices in Bronx County); see also, Harvey v. Ogunfowora, 179 A.D.3d 775 (2d Dep't 2020) (holding that moving defendants' reliance on an affirmation of counsel instead of their own affidavits attesting to their places of residence did not satisfy defendant's initial burden of proving that plaintiff's choice of venue was improper).

Here, in contrast, Dr. Goldstein's sworn, detailed, non-conclusory affidavit plainly showed that Plaintiff chose the wrong venue when she designated Bronx County on the assumption that Bronx County was Dr. Goldstein's principal place of business. Further, Dr. Goldstein's affidavit was supported by Dr. Meixner's affirmation (with supporting documents) attesting that Westmed has its principal place of business in Westchester County and that Dr. Goldstein, in his capacity as a Westmed employee, treated Plaintiff, a Westmed patient, at Westmed locations in Westchester County.

B. <u>No Defendant Has A Principal Place of Business in Bronx County</u>

Plaintiff improperly designated Bronx County as the venue on the basis

of "defendants' principal place of business" in that county (R. 19).⁵

CPLR §503 (Venue based on residence) provides in pertinent part:

(c) Corporation. A domestic corporation, or a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in the state, shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its principal office is located; except that such a corporation, if a railroad or other common carrier, shall also be deemed a resident of the county where the cause of action arose.

(d) Unincorporated association, partnership, or individuallyowned business. A president or treasurer of an unincorporated association, suing or being sued on behalf of the association, shall be deemed a resident of any county in which the association has its principal office, as well as the county in which he actually resides. A partnership or an individually-owned business shall be deemed a resident of any county in which it has its principal

⁵ Plaintiff did not designate venue on the basis of the abode, as opposed to the principal location of a business, of any of natural persons who have been named in this action. *See* CPLR §503(a); *Addo v. Melnick*, 61 A.D.3d 453 (1st Dep't 2009) (holding that the residence of a natural person is his or her abode, not his or her office). In any event, it is undisputed that Plaintiff and Dr. Goldstein lived in Westchester County and Dr. Prakash lived in the State of Washington when this action was commenced.

office, as well as the county in which the partner or individual owner suing or being sued actually resides.

As it is undisputed the corporate entity Westmed has its principal office in Westchester County, there was no basis for placing venue in Bronx County under CPLR §503(c). The dispositive issue is whether Dr. Goldstein, a Westmed employee, who was sued individually for his treatment of Plaintiff, a Westmed patient, in Westchester County, was a "resident" of Bronx County under CPLR §503(d). The Appellate Division has held that where a physician is sued in his or her capacity as a medical doctor, "the county of an individual's *principal* office is a proper venue for claims *arising out of that business.*" *See Young Sun Chung v. Kwah*, 122 A.D.3d 729, 730 (2d Dep't 2014) (emphasis added); *see also Castro-Recio v. Rottenberg*, 287 A.D.2d 532 (2d Dep't 2001); *Shanahan v. Klinginstein*, 280 A.D.2d 464 (2d Dep't 2001).

Other than the majority below, it appears that no New York appellate court has held that venue under CPLR §503(d), on the basis of the residence of an "individually-owned business," can be designated in a county where the individual's principal office was *not* located and where the plaintiff asserts claims *not* arising out of that business. The majority here appears to have decided that "regular practice" (*see Lividini*, 175 A.D.3d at 420, 423) - a phrase not appearing in the venue statutes - is the equivalent of "principal place of business." But the ordinary meaning of the word "principal" is "first in rank, authority, importance, degree, etc." *Webster's*

New World College Dictionary (4th ed.), at 1141. Here the record is clear that Dr. Goldstein mainly practiced in Westchester County, even if he "regularly" practiced, to a relatively minor degree, in Bronx County.

On the contrary, in Magrone v. Herzog, 304 A.D.2d 801 (2d Dep't 2003), the Appellate Division held that plaintiffs improperly placed the venue of a medical malpractice action in Kings County based on the existence of defendant's office in that county. The court held that "[a]lthough Herzog maintained a medical office in Kings County, the defendants established that Herzog maintained his principal medical office in Richmond County, and that is where the alleged malpractice occurred." Magrone, 304 A.D.2d at 802 (emphasis added); see also DiCicco, 5 A.D.3d at 318 (affirming change of venue to Richmond County where individually named physician maintained his principal office and was where the alleged malpractice occurred); Jacobson v. Gaffney, 178 A.D.3d 1026 (2d Dep't 2019) (affirming change of venue from Dutchess to Tompkins County where individually-named physician's principal office and actual residence were located in Tompkins County).

Here, as noted, Dr. Goldstein devoted most his practice to treating Westmed patients in Westchester County. Moreover, the claims in this action arise from that aspect of his practice. Plaintiff was treated exclusively by Westmed, Dr. Goldstein, and Dr. Prakash in Westchester County. This suit has no connection

to Dr. Goldstein's limited presence in Bronx County based on his affiliation with St. Barnabas Hospital. See Berman v. Gucciardo, 50 A.D.3d 717 (2d Dep't 2008) (holding that plaintiff improperly placed venue in Queens County under CPLR §503(d) based on the purported Forest Hills business address of his law practice where the action was not commenced on behalf of or related to the plaintiff's law practice); Friedman v. Law, 60 A.D.2d 832 (2d Dep't 1978) (holding that venue in Kings County was improper where the real property at issue was located in New York County, all of the parties resided in that county, the witnesses were located in that county, and the only contact with Kings County was the fact that plaintiff maintained an office in that county for the practice of law, which was not his principal place of business and was not related to the real property dispute); Venuti v. Novelli, 179 A.D.2d 477 (1st Dep't 1992) (holding that venue was improperly placed in Bronx County where defendant's video repair business in Bronx County was unrelated to a property maintenance business in Westchester County or the Westchester County property where the accident at issue occurred). The mere fact that Dr. Goldstein's listed a Bronx County address in his NYSED license registration did not negate his showing that his principal place of business was in Westchester County. See DiCicco, 5 A.D.3d at 318; Kielczewski, 226 A.D.2d at 212.

C. <u>A Change In Venue Would Be Consistent with the Recent Amendment to</u> <u>CPLR §503(a).</u>

Finally, transferring this action to Westchester County would be consistent with a recent amendment of CPLR §503(a). As amended in 2017, the statute now places the location of the events at issue on equal footing with a party's residence. The current version of statute provides:

> Generally. Except where otherwise prescribed by law, the place of trial shall be in the county in which one of the parties resided when it was commenced; the county in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; or, if none of the parties then resided in the state, in any county designated by the plaintiff. A party resident in more than one county shall be deemed a resident of each such county.

The purpose of the amendment was to "allow for the venue used in a

civil action to be the same county in which a substantial part of the event occurred."

Assembly Mem, Bill Jacket , L 2017, ch 366, at 1.). The sponsoring memorandum

explains that

[i]n civil actions, venue refers to the correct county in which to bring an action. In New York State, in the absence of a prior agreement, the option on where to place venue are restrictive. [Except in certain circumstances], choice of venue is limited to the county of residence of one of the parties. A problem arises if both plaintiff and defendant are residents of a different county from the county in which the cause of action arose. In that case, proper venue is either in the county of residence of the plaintiff or defendant, but not where the incident occurred. This means that, absent residence of a party in the subject county, that county's court system has no authority to hear controversies about unsafe premises, unsafe worksites, unsafe driving and a myriad of other scenarios within its borders. Nor are jurors from the subject community, with the most interest in setting community standards, able to hear such controversies. In addition, witnesses are often located in [the] county where the events that are the subject of the action occurred. *Id*.

The memorandum adds that the amendment would bring New York in conformance with federal law, which allows venue "'in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred' 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(2)."

Here, as the dissent below observed, "Bronx County has no nexus with this dispute." *Lividini*, 175 A.D.3d at 426 [Singh and Friedman dissenting]). All of the medical treatment at issue was rendered in Westchester County, where Westmed, a large healthcare organization, is located. Jurors in Westchester County have the most interest in deciding whether the care and treatment rendered to Plaintiff by Westmed, its affiliates, and employees was consistent with community standards.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Appellate Division,

First Department should be reversed and the venue of this action should be

transferred to Westchester County.

Dated: White Plains, New York August 20, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Heidell, Pittoni, Murphy & Bach LLP

By:

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PRINTING SPECIFICATIONS STATEMENT

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR Section 1250.8(j) the foregoing brief was prepared on a computer using Microsoft Word.

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WORD COUNT: The total number of words in the brief, inclusive of point headings and footnotes and exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, table of citations, proof of service and certificate of compliance, or any authorized addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, etc. is 3797.

STATEMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 5531

Court of Appeals

of the State of New York

RACQUEL LIVIDINI,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

- against -

HAROLD L. GOLDSTEIN, D.P.M. and VINAI PRAKASH, D.P.M.,

Defendants-Respondents,

- and -

RYE AMBULATORY SURGERY CENTER, L.L.C. and WESTMED MEDICAL GROUP, P.C.,

Defendants-Appellants.

- 1. The index number of the case in the Court below is 20675/2018E.
- 2. The full names of the original parties are set forth above. There has been no change to the caption.
- 3. The action was commenced in the Supreme Court, Bronx County.
- 4. This action was commenced on or about January 18, 2018, by the filing of a Summons and Verified Complaint. Issue was joined by service of a Verified Answer of Harold L. Goldstein, D.P.M. on or about March 22, 2018. A Verified Answer of Rye Ambulatory Surgery Center, LLC was served on or about April 2, 2018. A Verified Answer of WestMed Medical Group, P.C. was served on or about April 2, 2018. A Verified Answer of Vinai Prakash, D.P.M. was served on or about April 19, 2018.
- 5. The nature and object of the action: podiatric malpractice.
- 6. This appeal was initiated in the Appellate Division from the Supreme Court Decisions and Orders of Honorable Joseph Capella, dated July 20, 2018. The Appeal was taken to the New York State Court of Appeals from the Appellate Division First Department Order, dated August 20, 2019.
- 7. This appeal is being perfected with the use of a fully reproduced Record on Appeal.

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

STATE OF NEW YORK)
)
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER)

Brian R. Landy, Jr., being duly sworn, deposes and says that deponent is not a party to the action, is over 18 years of age, and resides at 38 Davis Avenue, Rye, New York 10580.

That on the 20th day of August, 2020 deponent served the within:

Brief for Defendants-Appellants

upon designated counsel for the parties indicated herein at the addresses provided below by depositing 3 true copies thereof enclosed in a post-paid wrapper, in an official depository under the exclusive care and custody of the U.S. Postal Service within New York State.

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Sworn to before me this 20^{th} day of August, 2020

Eric R. Larke Notary Public, State of New York No. 01LA5067236 Qualified in Westchester County Commission Expires March 5, 2023

14459