The question in this case is whether Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) § 1194(2) allows a motorist’s refusal to submit to a chemical test more than two hours after being arrested for driving under the influence to be used against the motorist in an administrative license-revocation proceeding.
Under VTL § 1194(2), all motor-vehicle operators in New York are deemed to have consented to chemical tests of their breath, blood, urine, and saliva “at the direction of a police officer . . . having reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been” driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, “within two hours after such person has been placed under arrest for any such violation.” Drivers who refuse such a test, after being properly warned, have their licenses immediately revoked and can challenge the revocation in an administrative proceeding.
In this case, Pedro Endara-Caicedo was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Four hours after his arrest, police officers asked him to take a breathalyzer test and warned him that his license would be revoked if he refused. He refused the test. He later challenged the revocation in an administrative proceeding, in which the Department of Motor Vehicles upheld the revocation.
Endara-Caicedo then brought a CPLR Article 78 proceeding to annul DMV’s determination. He claimed that the phrase “within two hours” in § 1194(2) meant that he was no longer deemed to have consented to a chemical test two hours after his arrest, and so his refusal could not be used against him in administrative license-revocation proceedings. Supreme Court denied the petition.
The First Department affirmed. According to the First Department, § 1194(2)’s two-hour limitation “is confined to the admissibility of the chemical test results (or the chemical test refusal) in a criminal action against the motorist.” The limitation does not apply to administrative license-revocation proceedings. In so holding, the First Department relied on the fact that four Court of Appeals judges—in People v. Odum, a 2018 case decided on different grounds—expressed that view of the two-hour limitation in concurring and dissenting opinions. The First Department also relied on the legislative history of § 1194 and “the longstanding policy of this State, and this Nation, to discourage drunk driving in the strongest terms possible.”
The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.