The question in this case is whether the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) may house a level three sex offender in a residential treatment facility during his term of supervised release.
The Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) requires any person convicted of certain enumerated crimes to register with the State. An offender who is subject to SORA registration is assigned a designation based on the risk that he will reoffend–either level one, two, or three in ascending order of risk. State law imposes requirements that vary based on an offender’s level designation. For instance, the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) requires that level three offenders reside more than 1,000 feet from any school.
In this case, defendant plead guilty to charges of first-degree robbery and attempted first-degree sexual abuse and was sentenced to 10 years’ prison with five years’ postrelease supervision (PRS). At the end of defendant’s prison term, DOCCS refused to release him because he had been adjudicated a level three sex offender but could not secure SARA-compliant housing, in that he could not find housing that was more than 1000 feet from a school. Instead, DOCCS placed defendant in a residential treatment facility until he could find compliant housing.
Defendant filed a habeas petition, alleging that his placement in a residential treatment facility was unconstitutional. Supreme Court denied the petition, defendant appealed directly to the Court of Appeals, and the Court remitted the matter to the Appellate Division for a normal-course appeal. Meanwhile, defendant was released to SARA-compliant housing.
At the outset, the Second Department held that the appeal was not moot, finding that the constitutional issues raised in the petition were important and were “likely to arise in other cases but also likely to evade review.”
On the merits, the court held that placing defendant in a residential treatment facility while he located SARA-compliant housing did not violate the constitution. A defendant on PRS, the court explained, does not have a fundamental right to be free from the conditions of his release. Thus, the decision to place defendant in a residential treatment facility while he located SARA-compliant housing would be constitutional so long as it was rationally related to a conceivable government interest. And it was, the court held, since it advanced the purpose behind the 1000-foot restriction in the first place–that is, “protect[ing] children from the risk of recidivism by certain convicted sex offenders by keeping those offenders at a distance from school children.” Placing defendant in a residential treatment facility also was not an extension of his imprisonment and thus did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right.