The question in this case is whether the statutory provision barring sex offenders from entering onto or living near school grounds violates substantive due process.
Executive Law § 259-c(14) provides that sex offenders who are covered by that section and are granted parole must, as a condition of their parole release, be prohibited from going onto or living near school grounds. Another case currently before the Court, People ex rel. Negron v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility, raises questions about which sex offenders are covered by the school-grounds restriction. This case, by contrast, raises a constitutional challenge to that restriction.
Petitioner is a sex offender covered by the school-grounds restriction from Executive Law § 259-c(14). He was granted parole in 2017, but was not released because he did not have a place to live that complied with the school-ground restriction: he was on the wait-list for compliant housing and had not suggested an acceptable alternative. In the meantime, petitioner commenced this habeas corpus proceeding, claiming that the school-grounds restriction in Executive Law § 259-c(14) violated his right to substantive due process.
Supreme Court denied the petition, and the Third Department affirmed. The court explained that an inmate does not have a fundamental right to parole release, even an inmate who has been granted parole. Because an inmate’s right to parole is not fundamental, government acts that restrict that right are subject to constitutional review for a rational basis. And the school-grounds restriction was not an irrational way of advancing the Legislature’s legitimate interest in protecting children from the risk of recidivism by sex offenders covered by Executive Law § 259-c(14). Ultimately, the court acknowledged that the school-grounds restriction might not be the best way to achieve the Legislature’s goals. But the court emphasized that “the argument that there are better or wiser ways to achieve the law’s stated objectives must be addressed to the Legislature.”
In a concurring opinion, two judges wrote separately to emphasize the “damaging practical consequences and questionable effectiveness” of the school-grounds restriction. To be sure, these concerns should be left to the Legislature to address. But the concurring judges urged the Legislature to do just that, citing the “need for a timely reexamination of these significant questions of policy and public safety.”
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right.