The question in this case is whether the rule from Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), that a sitting President is not immune from a civil suit filed in federal court also applies to a civil suit filed in state court.
Plaintiff was a contestant on defendant Donald Trump’s reality television show, The Apprentice. She alleges that she continued a professional relationship with Trump after leaving the show hoping to pursue employment with his company. But Trump made unwanted sexual advances toward her and sexually assaulted her at one of his hotels. During Trump’s presidential campaign, plaintiff recounted her allegations of sexual abuse and assault in the press, and Trump denied the allegations and made disparaging remarks about her. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit several days before Trump became President, seeking damages for defamation as the result of Trump’s disparaging remarks. Trump sought to have the case dismissed or stayed pending his term in office.
Supreme Court denied Trump’s motion to dismiss. Pointing to the Clinton decision, the court found it settled that a civil suit about a sitting President’s unofficial conduct did not raise any separation-of-powers concerns that would warrant making him immune from suit. The fact that the claims were asserted in a state court did not alter the calculus, the court held, because there was no risk that the state would “encroach on powers given to the federal government by interfering with the manner in which the President performs federal functions.” This was critical, the court concluded, because potential interference with official duties was the main concern identified in Clinton that might justify a presidential immunity from suit. The absence of any possible interference with official duties here meant that immunity was equally inappropriate in this case.
A divided panel of the First Department affirmed. The majority (per Renwick, J.) rejected Trump’s argument that the Supremacy Clause immunizes the President from state lawsuits. That clause allows federal law to displace conflicting state law in certain circumstances, but it does not exempt the President from following state law in all circumstances merely by virtue of his office. As the majority observed, “the President is still a person, and he is not above the law.” The majority noted that the circumstances at issue in Clinton were “materially indistinguishable.” To be sure, the Court in that case, which was filed in federal court, flagged that different concerns might arise if the case were filed in state court. But the majority considered those concerns and concluded that they did not raise a constitutional bar because maintenance of a state court civil suit would not “interfere with [the President’s] execution of federal law.”
The dissenters would have granted Trump’s motion to dismiss. Clinton should not apply, the dissenters concluded, because it was grounded in principles about the allocation of federal power among the coordinate branches (i.e., separation-of-powers doctrine). But this case involved a state court, which was not a part of the constitutional “tripartite system of governance,” and thus did not implicate the power-allocation concerns at issue in Clinton. Because Clinton was no answer for this case, the dissenters thought that plaintiff was required to identify some “independent reason why the Supremacy Clause does not prevent the New York state courts from having jurisdiction over her action.” In the dissenter’s view, plaintiff failed to identify any such reason.
The First Department granted Trump leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
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