As we explained in our case summary, the question in this case was whether New York courts had jurisdiction to resolve a dispute between competing factions of the Cayuga Nation as to possession of certain tribal property. The Court (Feinman, J.) held that the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claims and dismissed the action.
In brief, plaintiffs and defendants in this case were two rival factions claiming to be the rightful leader of the tribe. Plaintiffs had secured an order from the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) recognizing that faction as the tribal leadership. On the authority of the BIA’s order, plaintiffs brought this action seeking to dispossess defendants of tribal property that they had seized.
The majority began by noting that state courts lacked authority to resolve tribal governance disputes. Although there were statutes granting state courts subject matter jurisdiction over suits involving tribe members, the majority concluded that those statutes did not also authorize state courts to resolve tribal disputes. And plaintiffs’ claims would “unquestionably implicate” such a tribal dispute: in the majority’s description, “[t]he only disputed question [was] who may lawfully possess and control the property, a question that necessarily turn[ed] on which faction—either plaintiff or defendants—is the rightful leadership council that speaks for the Nation.” The majority also refused to view the BIA’s recognition order as binding on the tribal governance issue—a point on which all six participating judges appeared to agree. The BIA order was issued for the limited purpose of facilitating the disbursement of federal funds, the majority explained, and did not effect a broader ruling about tribal governance.
Judge Garcia dissented, asserting that the majority “fail[ed] to grapple with the nuances of the asserted claims.” As he read the complaint, plaintiffs alleged that defendants were using tribal property for their personal use. And for Judge Garcia, defendants’ personal use could be identified “without any assessment of the tribe’s leadership conflict.” Thus, he would have concluded that plaintiffs’ claims could be adjudicated without resolving an internal tribal dispute.
Judge Wilson also dissented in a lengthy opinion that raised several points of dispute with the majority. Among other things, Judge Wilson noted an open question about whether the subject property was reservation land over which the Nation had tribal sovereignty at all. Without tribal sovereignty, the lands would be merely like other land located within New York State, and the state courts would uncontrovertially have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.
Judge Wilson also noted that federal and state statutes expressly granted state courts subject matter jurisdiction over actions and proceedings “between Indians.” For Judge Wilson, these statutes answered the question whether the state courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the parties’ dispute. And in his view, neither federal primacy in the area of “Indian relations” nor tribal sovereignty interests were implicated by these grants of jurisdiction.
The balance of Judge Wilson’s dissent addressed perceived deficiencies in the majority’s analysis, including its citation to authority (which he disapproved of) and its decision that plaintiffs were authorized to bring suit on behalf of the Nation (a conclusion he agreed with but refused to assume, as the majority had done).
Return to the case page for Cayuga Nation v. Campbell.