As we explained in our case summary, the question in this case was whether the City of Buffalo rationally determined that a police officer was not acting within the scope of his employment when he assaulted an unarmed civilian. The Court (mem.) held that the City’s decision was not irrational.
The majority confined its analysis to Buffalo City Code § 35-28. That provision required the City to defend an employee if the City decided that certain conditions were satisfied, including that the employee had not violated any City rule or engaged in any intentional wrongdoing. The petitioner in this case was a police officer who was videotaped using excessive force on an unarmed civilian and later indicted (but acquitted) for the assault. In the majority’s view, the City did not act irrationally in concluding that, under Buffalo City Code § 35-28, it was not required to defend petitioner because his conduct violated City rules and constituted intentional wrongdoing.
Rather than apply Buffalo City Code § 35-28, the dissent (Wilson, J.) would have applied General Municipal Law (GML) § 50-j(1) and resolved a “question of statewide importance” that the Court had “never addressed – the obligation to defend and indemnify under GML 50-j(1).” The dissent would have concluded that GML § 50-j(1) imposed obligations on local governments according to the common-law respondeat superior standard articulated in Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297 (1979). And in the dissent’s view, applying that standard to the petitioner’s case would have required the City to defend and indemnify him.
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