As we explained in our case summary, the question in this case was whether a corrections officer was injured an “act of any inmate” when an intoxicated inmate fell on her? The Court (Feinman, J.) held that the officer’s injury was caused by an “act” of an inmate, even though that act was not intentional.
Retirement and Social Security Law (RSSL) § 607-c(a) provided performance-of-duty (POD) disability retirement benefits if, among other things, a corrections officer was injured by “any act of any inmate.” According to the majority, the plain meaning of the phrase “any act of any inmate” included both voluntary and involuntary conduct of an inmate. To support its plain meaning, the majority pointed to Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed.) and other sources that defined the word “act” to include both voluntary and involuntary conduct. And the majority pointed to the Court’s use of the phrases “involuntary act” and “act of falling” in prior decisions as reflecting the “usual and commonly understood meaning” of “act” to include involuntary conduct.
The concurrence (Wilson, J.) added that the structure of the RSSL § 607-c and its legislative history supported the majority’s decision. Two sections of the statute authorized POD disability retirement benefits. Interpreting one of those sections to cover voluntary and involuntary acts by an inmate, the concurrence noted, was the only way to give distinct meaning to each section. Legislative history also indicated that the Legislature sought to expand rather than restrict benefits available to corrections officers, and thus supported the majority’s conclusion that benefits were be available for injuries caused by voluntary and involuntary acts of inmates.
The dissent (Rivera, J.) also looked to Black’s Law Dictionary (as well as other dictionaries) to define the word “act” but concluded that an earlier version (6th ed.) was relevant because RSSL § 607-c was modeled on statutory language from other provisions that were enacted before the seventh edition of Black’s was published. Surveying the correct sources, the dissent concluded that the plain meaning of “act” was limited to voluntary acts and did not encompass involuntary conduct. This approach conformed to the dissent’s view of the statute’s structure, because it made the more-generous POD disability retirement benefits available in fewer cases than ordinary disability retirement benefits. And it better accounted for the dissent’s reading o the legislative history, which indicated that more-generous POD were granted because corrections officers were exposed to violent conduct by inmates, not a mere “inmate misstep.”
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