As we explained in our case summary, the question in this case was whether the statutory provision barring sex offenders from entering onto or living near school grounds was mandatory for someone who was adjudicated a Level III sex offender but whose predicate offense was not a qualifying offense. In a 5-2 decision, the Court (Garcia, J.) held that the school-zone restriction was mandatory only for Level III sex offenders who committed an qualifying offense.
This was a statutory interpretation case about the meaning of Executive Law § 259-c(14). That provision stated that the the school-zone restriction applied to “a person serving a sentence for [a qualifying offense] and the victim of such offense was under the age of eighteen at the time of such offense or such person has been designated a [SORA] level three sex offender.” The majority and dissent agreed that the provision was poorly drafted. The question remained: was the school-zone restriction mandatory for (i) any person convicted of a qualifying offense that they committed against a minor, and (ii) any person designated a Level III sex offender (as the Second and Fourth Departments held)? Or was the school-zone restriction mandatory for (i) any person convicted of a qualifying offense committed against a minor, and (ii) any person convicted of a qualifying offense who was designated a Level III sex offender (as the Third Department held below)?
The majority sided with the Third Department. The majority focused on whether the phrase “such person” referred back to “a person” or to “a person serving a sentence for [a qualifying offense].” Although understanding the meaning of the word “such” in these kinds of situations was generally context-dependent, the majority noted that the “normal usage” of the word would refer to “the entire antecedent phrase.” In the majority’s view, that reading was clear from the statute’s text and was buttressed by other provisions of the statute. That approach also was not inconsistent with the statute’s legislative history, the majority added, even if the history “appear[ed] to favor” a different interpretation.
In dissent, Judge Fahey concluded that evaluation of the legislative history was necessary, and disagreed with the majority’s reading of the history, which in his view “strongly support[ed]” making the school-zone restriction mandatory for all Level III designees. The dissent mainly relied on statements from the sponsor’s memorandum contained in a bill jacket, which the majority brushed off as “general references” or “shorthand.” Not so, claimed the dissent, as those references showed a clear intent to apply the school-zone restriction automatically to all Level III sex offender. The dissent added that, while letters contained in that bill jacket did not “establish the legislature’s intent,” those letters were probative because they too reflected a common understanding that the statute would make the school-zone restriction mandatory for all Level III designees.