As we explained in our case summary, the question in this case is whether a court may dispense with the requirement that an intellectually disabled adult consent to her adoption. In a 5-2 decision, the Court (DiFiore, C.J.) answered yes, holding that in some instances a court can dispense with the consent requirement for adult adoptions.
Marian T. is an intellectually disabled 66-year-old woman. In 2015, the operators of a family care home where Marian lives petitioned to adopt her. Under Domestic Relations Law § 111(1)(a), an “adoptive child” who is “over fourteen years of age” must consent to her adoption “unless the judge or surrogate in his discretion dispenses with such consent.” Surrogate’s Court dispensed with Marian’s consent, and the Third Department affirmed, holding that Marian’s disability left her unable to consent, and so her consent was “unnecessary.”
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Treating the matter as “one of pure statutory interpretation,” the majority held that § 111(1)(a) grants a court discretion to decide whether to dispense with the consent of an “adoptive child” who is older than 14. In so holding, the majority rejected the argument that “adoptive child” refers to a person who is a minor. “‘Adoptive child,’” the majority pointed out, “is a term of art defined in the statutory scheme [in Domestic Relations Law § 109] to mean ‘a person adopted.’” That definition did not limit the term to people under 18. The court also held that Surrogate’s Court did not abuse its discretion in dispensing with adoption, given the “extensive record developed in Surrogate’s Court,” showing that Marian lacked capacity to consent. Finally, the Court held that adoption would be in Marian’s best interests
Judge Wilson concurred in the result. He believed that the majority’s reading of the statute would make it unconstitutional by allowing adults to adopt other adults without first gaining the consent of the adoptees. To avoid that unconstitutional reading, Judge Wilson read the statute as requiring consent only if the adoptive child was capable of consenting. He rooted that reading “in the ancient doctrine of lex not cogit impossibiliia—the law does not require impossibilities.” Because it is impossible for severely mentally disabled people to consent, the adoption statute cannot be read to require their consent.
Judge Rivera dissented. Relying on the adoption statute’s legislative history, she reasoned that courts may dispense with consent of an adopted child only in a narrow circumstance: when the adoptive child lacked “knowledge that the adoptive parents were not biological kin.” Dispensing with consent in those instance “avoid[s] potential trauma to adolescent adoptees” who believe their adoptive parents to be their biological parents. The dissent also criticized the majority for treating intellectually disabled adults as children. Judge Rivera explained that it is “discriminatory and unjust . . . to treat [Marian] and adults with intellectual limitations differently from all other adults.”