As we explained in our case summary, the question in this case was whether plaintiffs were required to bring their rent overcharge claims in administrative proceedings before the Department of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR), rather than in an action in Supreme Court. A divided court (mem.) held that plaintiffs were not required to proceed in administrative proceedings, but that they failed to state a GBL 349 claim.
At the outset, the majority held that plaintiffs were not required to pursue administrative proceedings before filing suit in court. The lower courts had held to the contrary, invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. That doctrine was effectively abrogated, the majority held, by a provision of the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA), which expressly granted overcharge plaintiffs a “choice of forum” between Supreme Court and DHCR. That express provision applied and meant that plaintiffs were entitled to pursue claims in Supreme Court without first pursuing those claims with DHCR.
The majority held, however, that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under GBL 349. That provision generally prohibits deceptive practices in consumer-oriented conduct. But a plaintiff does not allege deceptive practices within the meaning of the statute, the court emphasized, merely by alleging that the defendant failed to admit that it had done something allegedly unlawful. And in the majority’s view, that was all that plaintiffs had alleged in this case: that defendants acted deceptively by unlawfully deregulating their apartments. Plaintiffs GBL 349 claims failed accordingly.
Judge Rivera dissented. Although she agreed that primary jurisdiction was no bar to plaintiffs claims after the HSTPA, she would have remanded the case for Supreme Court to consider the sufficiency of the complaint in the first instance.