The question in this case was whether the Town of Smithtown could by ordinance lawfully regulate in certain respects the discharge of a bow and arrow. In a unanimous memorandum decision, the Court concluded that Town Law § 130(27) did not authorize Smithtown’s ordinance and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision invalidating the ordinance.
The Court’s analysis was straightforward. Town Law § 130(27) allows towns to prohibit the discharge of “firearms” in a manner that is more restrictive than prevailing state law. Smithtown purported to invoke that authority in enacting its ordinance. But, as the Court made clear, a bow and arrow is not a “firearm” as that term is used in Town Law § 130(27). Notably, in construing the term, which was added to the Town Law in 1966, the Court cited dictionaries—Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. Rev. 1968) and Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3rd ed. 1969)—with publication dates that were roughly contemporaneous with the provision’s enactment.
That interesting observation aside, the Court’s decision was more significant for what it did not decide. The parties briefed this case primarily as a conflict preemption case, and the Second Department decided it as one. The Court ducked the preemption issue, however, finding that Smithtown had conceded in the trial court and the Appellate Division that its ordinance would be invalid if it were not authorized by Town Law § 130(27). And concluding that Town Law § 130(27) did not authorize the ordinance, the Court declined to consider whether preemption would prohibit the ordinance if it had been authorized some other way.