As we explained in our case summary, the issue in this case was whether venue was proper in a county based on the defendant’s listing of an address in that county on his submission professional-licensing authorities. In a 4–3 decision, the Court (mem.) held that the venue was improper, given that the defendant submitted an affidavit explaining that his principal place of business was in a different county than the one where he was sued.
After Raquel Lividini suffered an injury during medical treatment, she sued her treating doctor, Harold Goldstein, along with Rye Ambulatory Surgery Center and Westmed Medical Group. The treatment occurred in Westchester County, which is where Lividini lives and where Rye Ambulatory and Westmed are located. Yet Lividini sued in Bronx County, alleging that venue was proper there under CPLR 503(a) and 503(d) because Dr. Goldstein’s practice was “an individually-owned business” with its “principal office” in Bronx County.
The Court of Appeals disagreed. It relied on Dr. Goldstein’s affidavit, submitted in support of his venue-transfer motion, stating that his “principal place of business” was in Westchester County. Although that affidavit acknowledged that Dr. Goldstein also worked at a hospital and another location in Bronx County, it explained that he earned 75% of his income from his work in Westchester, where he cared for 20 times as many patients as he cared for in the Bronx. And while the Court noted that Dr. Goldstein had “provided a Bronx mailing address to the New York State Education Department for processional licensing purposes,” nothing in the record supported the inference “that Dr. Goldstein was ever required to identify (or in fact identified) any particular county as the location of his principal office, a designation not contemplated in the relevant processional licensing statutes.”
Judge Rivera dissented, joined by Judges Wilson and Fahey. In her view, Dr. Goldstein had not met his burden to show that a venue transfer was appropriate. Judge Rivera explained that under CPLR 503(a), venue is appropriate “in the county in which one of the parties resided when [the action] was commenced” and that under CPLR 503(d), an “individually-owned business shall be deemed a resident of any county in which it has a principal office.” Dr. Goldstein’s affidavit, the dissent observed, did not identify the doctor’s “principal office”; it identified his “principal place of business.” For that reason, the dissent believed that the affidavit did not suffice. The dissent also believed that even if Dr. Goldstein’s affidavit established prima facie that his principal office was in Westchester County, Lividini had rebutted that showing by pointing to the doctor’s professional-licensing submissions.