As we explained in our case summary, the question in this case is whether a plaintiff suing veterinary clinic for injuries suffered during an animal attack on its premises must show that the clinic knew that the animal had “vicious propensities.” The Court (Stein, J.) held that the vicious-propensities requirement (sometimes known as the “one-bite rule”) does not apply to veterinary clinics.
The facts of this case are straightforward. While Marsha Hewitt and her cat were waiting in the Palmer Veterinary Clinic’s waiting room, a dog that the Clinic had just treated attacked Hewitt’s cat. The dog bit Hewitt in the process. Hewitt sued the Clinic for the injuries she suffered. Her complaint claimed that the Clinic was negligent in bringing an agitated dog into the waiting room and failing to adjust its collar to prevent it from getting loose. In a bill of particulars, Hewitt alleged that the Clinic was also negligent in failing to properly manage the dog’s pain and thus prevent its agitation.
The Court held that Hewitt could prevail without proving that the Clinic knew that the dog had vicious propensities. Veterinary clinics owe their clients a duty to provide a safe waiting room, the Court explained, and “are uniquely well-equipped to anticipate and guard against the risk of aggressive animal behavior that may occur in their practices.” And clinics “have substantial control” over their waiting rooms, which they may “design[] to mitigate this risk.” Thus, the Court concluded, a clinic may be liable when it fails to provide a safe waiting room, even if it does not know that an attacking animal tended to attack.
The Court also held Hewitt was too late in asserting her additional theory of liability—that the Clinic failed to properly manage the dog’s pain. Because Hewitt did not advance that theory until several years into the case, Supreme Court properly struck it.
Judge Wilson, joined by Judges Rivera and Fahey, concurred in part. As Judge Wilson explained, under the Court’s holding in Bard v. Jahnke, pet owners can be liable only in strict liability, and only if they knew of their pets’ vicious propensities. Outside the pet-owner context, Judge Wilson opined, it would be unfair to attack victims to condition liability on vicious propensity.
Judge Wilson parted ways with the majority on Hewitt’s bill of particulars. He would have allowed to proceed on her secondary theory, even though she added it years into the case. He noted that the Clinic had not shown “prejudice or surprise” from the late addition. And Hewitt would have found it difficult to assert the theory earlier, given that it relied on information about how the Clinic managed the dog’s pain—information made available through discovery.